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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ANTITRUST-VERTICAL RESTRAINTS OF TERRITORY AND CUSTOMERS-
Section 1 of the Sherman Act-The United States Supreme Court, dis-
tinguishing between sales and agency transactions, has held that vertical
territorial or customer restrictions of a manufacturer relative to a sale are
per se violations and that restrictions incidental to an agency relation are
subject to the rule of reason.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct. 1856
(1967).
Faced with a highly competitive situation due to the presence in the
market of mass merchandisers such as Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. and its own unsatisfactory distribution system,
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,' a manufacturer of bicycles, undertook to stream-
line its marketing operations. By 1952 it had reduced the number of
distributors to 22 and the number of retailers from 15,000 to 5500. While
utilizing the method of franchising dealers, Schwinn did not prevent
either its distributors or dealers from selling competing brands, although
it did require that equal prominence and promotion be given to its prod-
ucts. The franchised dealer was required to purchase only from the
distributor serving his area and although not expressly prohibited from
selling to unauthorized wholesalers and retailers, such action would sub-
ject the dealer's franchise to cancellation. Each distributor was assigned
specific territories and instructed to deal only with dealers franchised
by Schwinn within that area.2 Distribution was accomplished through:
(1) sales to distributors; (2) sales to retailers utilizing an agency or con-
signment arrangement with distributors; (3) sales to retailers involving
direct shipment from the factory to the retailer, invoicing the dealer, and
paying commissions to the area distributor-denominated the Schwinn-
Plan.3
In its suit against Schwinn and the Schwinn Cycle Distributors As-
sociation,4 the United States charged a conspiracy to fix prices, allocate
exclusive territories, and restrict merchandise to franchised dealers" in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.6 The district court rejected
the price-fixing issue, but found that Schwinn and certain of its distribu-
tors had conspired to restrict territories with respect to products pur-
l. Hereinafter referred to as Schwinn.
2. The Supreme Court noted that Schwinn had been "firm and resolute" in insisting
upon compliance with the customer restrictions. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 372, 87 S. Ct. 1856, 1862 (1967).
3. Id. at 370, 87 S. Ct. at 1861.
4. B. F. Goodrich had been an additional defendant, but was dropped from the case
through a consent decree. Id. at 367, 87 S. Ct. at 1859.
5. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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chased from Schwinn and enjoined that practice.' It further held that
the other marketing practices, agency, consignment, and Schwinn-Plan,
were not violative of the Sherman Act.' On appeal the government con-
tended that territorial and customer restrictions, regardless of whether
incident to sales, agency, consignment, or Schwinn-Plan transactions,
should be enjoined. The Supreme Court expanded the district court's
decree and held that territorial and customer restrictions upon either a
wholesaler or retailer are per se violations when incident to a sales trans-
action,9 but that when similar restrictions are imposed upon agents of the
manufacturer, the manufacturer retaining title, dominion, and risk of loss
with respect to the product, the restrictions are illegal only if found to be
unreasonable restraints upon competition. 10
Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, relied principally upon
White Motor Co. v. United States" and Dr. Miles Medical v. John D.
Park & Sons Co. 12 in adopting a per se rule'3 with respect to vertical
restraints upon territory or customers where the manufacturer sells and
passes title to its product to the reseller. He reasoned that, if allowed, such
restrictions would violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation
since the nature of such a transaction includes an agreement, combina-
tion, or understanding. 4
The majority realized that certain benefits were derived from a market
comprised of numerous independent dealers and desired their perserva-
tion, especially in the face of competition from mass merchandisers;
mindful that the adoption of a per se rule for all vertical restrictions
would accelerate the trend toward vertical integration in distribution, 5
the majority, utilizing the approach set forth in White Motor, 6 applied
the "rule of reason' 7 to Schwinn's marketing practices involving agency,
consignment, and the Schwinn-Plan. In deciding that these distribution
7. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 343 (N.D. Ill. 1965). The
United States did not appeal the price-fixing finding nor did Schwinn challenge the ruling
of conspiracy. 388 U.S. at 368, 87 S. Ct. at 1860.
8. 237 F. Supp. at 343.
9. 388 U.S. at 378, 87 S. Ct. at 1865.
10. Id. at 380, 87 S. Ct. at 1866.
11. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
12. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
13. For a definition of per se illegality see, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging
Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569 (1964).
14. 388 U.S. at 377, 87 S. Ct. at 1865-66.
15. Id.
16. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
17. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For an historical development see Bork,
The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE
L.J. 775 (1965).
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practices were not unreasonable, the following factors were considered
controlling: that reasonably interchangeable products are readily avail-
able; that Schwinn's distributors and retailers handled competing brands;
that price-fixing was not present;'" that the marketing policies were
made necessary by, and went no farther than required by competitive
forces; and, that the policies preserved rather than destroyed competi-
tion. 9 A major factor considered by the Court in construing Schwinn's
practices was not only the effect on intrabrand competition, but also the
effect on interbrand competition. The Court reiterated that sound business
motives were insufficient to satisfy the rule of reason."
In White Motor Co. v. United States,2' decided in 1963, the Supreme
Court was faced with the same issues as presented in Schwinn. White
Motor Co., a truck manufacturer, had imposed in its dealer contracts
strictly defined territorial limits and reserved large customers to itself.
These restraints clearly come within the area of per se illegality now
adopted in Schwinn. In White Motor, the Supreme Court refused to adopt
a per se rule applicable to vertical territorial and customer restrictions
stating that it was unwilling to extend the per se doctrine without first
assessing the market impact of such practices. The district court, granting
a motion for summary judgment, had held that the restrictions were per se
violations of the Sherman Act. In reversing and remanding the case, the
Court indicated that it did not know enough of the "economic and
business stuff" out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain that
a per se violation resulted.2 2 The Supreme Court concluded in White
Motor that the legality of the restrictions could only be determined after
a trial. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion attempted to
establish guidelines for the trial court.23 He noted that while the vertical
restrictions were similar to both horizontal agreements to divide markets
and resale price maintenance agreements, both of which are per se viola-
tions, there were significant differences such as, the unilateral nature of
the restraints and the relative impact upon interbrand competition. Mr.
Justice Brennan suggested that these differences made necessary an
assessment of the following issues: (1) whether the restraints increase
18. The Court in dicta indicates it would have had little difficulty if price-fixing were
involved, 388 U.S. at 375, 87 S. Ct. at 1862. See note 34 infra.
19. It should be noted, although not expressly considered by the Court as a determina-
tive factor, that Schwinn did not improve its position in the market by the institution of
the marketing practices. In 1951 Schwinn had the largest single market share with 22.5%
and in 1962 it had 12.8%, 388 U.S. at 368, 87 S. Ct. at 1860.
20. Id. at 375, 87 S. Ct. at 1863; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940).
21. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
22. Id. at 263.
23. On remand the case terminated in a consent judgment. United States v. White Motor
Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
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interbrand competition; (2) whether the restraints are necessary for the
manufacturer's survival in the market; (3) whether the restraints go
farther than is reasonably necessary; and, (4) whether reasonable alterna-
tives are available. With respect to the customer restrictions, Mr. Justice
Brennan indicated that they would be much more difficult to justify. The
Court in Schwinn, after adopting the per se rule relative to sales, utilized
the first and third of Mr. Justice Brennan's issues in White Motor, in
concluding that the rule of reason was satisfied with respect to agency,
consignment, and Schwinn-Plan transactions. In addition the Court noted
the ready availability of alternate products and the practice of Schwinn's
distributors and dealers to market competing brands. It is submitted that
while the Court in Schwinn has adopted a per se rule relative to vertical
restraints in sales, the rationale of the White Motor decision remains
useful. The factors set forth by the Supreme Court in both cases continue
to furnish a basis upon which to judge marketing practices now in use.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, although
agreeing with the Court's basic "rule of reason" approach, disagreed with
the distinction made between sales and agency transactions.24 Believing
that the majority had misinterpreted the lower court's opinion, he com-
pared the conduct proscribed by the district court to a horizontal con-
spiracy of distributors with participation therein by the manufacturer
similar to that involved in United States v. General Motors Corp.25 He
asserted that the lower court was simply following the precedent set by
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.2" Mr. Justice Stewart also
felt that the majority had, in effect, repudiated White Motor." He further
challenged the Court's reliance on Dr. Miles Medical28 because it was
decided on common-law principles, although there was dicta to the effect
that the conduct would also have violated the Sherman Act,29 and con-
tended that the use of the rule against restraints on alienation does not
reflect the realities of marketing policies with mass advertising and
vertically integrated manufacturing-distribution systems. He concluded
that the outcome should not be based upon whether an arrangement is
denominated a sale or agency and that this ignores a basic precept that
substance rather than form is controlling."0
While the Court's reasons for making the distinction between sales
and agency transactions remains largely unarticulated, it is submitted
24. 388 U.S. at 389, 87 S. Ct. at 1871.
25. Where dealers requested that General Motors refuse to sell its automobiles to dis-
count houses; General Motors acceded to the request and this conduct was held to be a
horizontal conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
26. 341 U.S. 593, 71 S. Ct. 971 (1951).
27. See note 11 supra.
28. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
29. Id. at 409.
30. 388 U.S. at 393, 87 S. Ct. at 1873; Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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that the Court was seeking to strike a balance between the public policies
against restraints on alienation of chattels"' and basic antitrust policies
of maintenance of competition through a multiplicity of small independent
business units.32 In striving for this balance the middle ground chosen by
the Court does violence to neither of these policies, although it is probable
that the decision will adversely affect modem franchising. 33 The distinc-
tion between sales and agency transactions could actually be said to
foster both policies since it preserves the restraint on alienation policy
and frees the independent wholesaler and retailer from the fetters of
manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints. From the point of view of the
manufacturer, however, the elimination of the restrictions may not be
desirable and it must, therefore, choose between forward integration and
an agency relation as permitted by the Schwinn decision. It is submitted
that such an attempt at an agency relation should be undertaken with
due regard for the factors which the Court considered controlling in
allowing vertical restraints in Schwinn, but always mindful that the
adoption of an agency pattern may not be justified in every circum-
stance.34 At the very minimum therefore, the Schwinn decision seems to
necessitate a reappraisal by manufacturers of their marketing systems.3 5
31. For a discussion of this policy, see, Chaffee, The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1956); Chaffee, Equitable Ser-
vitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928).32. The Court here recognizes the overlapping policy aspects of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 et. seq., 44, and the Sherman Act. Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 29 A.B.A.
ANTTRUST SECTION 233 (1965); McLaren, Territorial Restrictions, Exclusive Dealing, and
Related Sales Distribution Problems Under the Antitrust Laws, 11 PRAc. LAW. No. 4:79
(1965).
33. For a general discussion of franchising see, Chadwell and Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects
of Dealer Licensing and Franchising, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1967); Averill, Antitrust Con-
siderations of the Principle Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements, 15 Am. U.L.
REv. 28 (1965).
34. Use of a consignment arrangement as a means of price-fixing has been held a per se
violation. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Union Oil Co. placed gasoline
with its dealers on consignment and attempted-to fix the retail price, threatening dealers
with cancellation of their lease for failure to comply. Simpson refused to follow Union's
prices and his lease was cancelled. The Supreme Court held that a Sherman Act violation
resulted, concluding that substance rather than form controlled. Union Oil Co. relied upon
the rationale of United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), wherein a con-
signment arrangement was upheld as a means of fixing prices on patented articles. The
Court in General Electric did not restrict its holding only to patented articles, 272 U.S. at
488, 47 S. Ct. 196, but in Simpson, Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished General Electric
factually and restricted it to its special facts-patented articles, 377 U.S. at 23. The Simpson
decision is criticized in Handier, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 Micu. L. Rxv.
59 (1964).
35. Recent cases having vertical overtones, but which were decided on other principles
are, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 87 S. Ct. 1847 (1967) (Sealy, wholly owned by 30 of
its 40 licensees, imposed territorial restraints upon its trademark licensees. The Court
held that a per se violation resulted because Sealy was a joint venture and the restric-
tions were in the nature of a horizontal conspiracy.); United States v. General Motors
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Such a reappraisal may portend difficulties for at least some manu-
facturers. A small manufacturer may find it difficult to obtain reliable
and responsible resellers when he is in competition with more powerful
suppliers or vertically integrated firms. Potential dealers may be re-
luctant to risk their own capital without such guarantees as are now
prohibited by the Schwinn decision. 6 Such dealers may be willing to
sacrifice some of their independence to protect their investments and
thus be inclined to accept an agency relationship. However, establishing
an agency relation requires a capital outlay which could well be beyond
the resources of many small manufacturers. A potential market entrant
will find it necessary to absorb the costs of setting up a distribution
system which is permitted by Schwinn 7 It would appear, therefore, that
while the Court recognizes the problem, the attempted solution is inade-
quate. Their solution both tends to decrease the ability of small firms to
effectively compete and increases market entry barriers. It is submitted
that a reexamination is necessary and this should include reconsideration
of the use of the rule of reason. Dennis P. Mankin
CONFLICT OF LAwS-JuRISDICTION-Minimum Contacts-The outer
limits of constitutionally valid jurisdiction are not exceeded by asserting
jurisdiction over a service corporation doing business solely in a foreign
state, if such corporation does a negligent act in the foreign state which
causes injury in the state of the forum.
Roche v. Floral Rental Corporation, 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162
(1967), appeal docketed, No.-, N.J. Sup. Ct. (1967).
The third party defendant, J.C. Truck Equipment Company (hereinafter
referred to as J.C.), respondent on appeal, had moved to set aside the
service of the lower court on the ground that the court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over J.C. This appeal was taken from the granting of that
motion.
On May 6, 1963, plaintiff's decedent was killed when his car collided
Corp., note 25 supra; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965)
(Treble damage action by franchisees against the franchisor of trademarked ice cream out-
lets in which the practices of exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and restricted supplier
provisions were examined.).
36. See, Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 111 (1962); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, 75 HARv. L. RaV. 795 (1962).
37. It is not clear the extent to which the Schwinn decision continues the exemption for
new market entrants from the per se rule. 388 U.S. at 375, 87 S. Ct. at 1863. Compare, White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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